THE TREATY OF AMIENS (1423): TOWARDS A RECONSIDERATION

The general character of the Hundred Years war in the 1420s was defined by the Treaty of Troyes signed on 21 May 1420 which was triggered by the murder on 10 September 1419 of John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy, during his negotiations with Dauphin Charles (the future Charles VII) at Montereau and a resulting Anglo-Burgundian rapprochement. The Treaty of Troyes was technically a peace treaty between Charles VI, king of France, and Henry V, king of England, prescribing that in order to put an end to the wars between the two kingdoms they should forever be governed by a single ruler. To ensure this it was agreed that on Charles VI’s death the crown of France would pass to Henry V and his heirs, while in the meantime Henry would be the regent of France. Thus the character of war changed significantly: from the three-sided conflict of the 1410s where the Armagnac-Burgundian feud combined with attempts to resist the English invasion it turned into a struggle for the French throne between the House of Valois (supported by the Dauphin and the remnants of the Armagnac party) and the House of Lancaster (supported by the English and most Burgundian partisans).

---

1 Author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Anne Curry and Dr Ekaterina Nosova who read the article in draft for their useful advice.
© A. Lobanov, 2016
It is not the aim of this paper to cast doubt on the importance of the Treaty of Troyes but rather to bring attention to another treaty remaining in its shadow: the Treaty of Amiens made on 17 April 1423. This was concluded by John of Lancaster, duke of Bedford, and regent of France (who replaced in this position his late brother Henry V), Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, and Jean V, duke of Brittany. The three dukes announced their intention to unite their houses by matrimonial links: the duke of Bedford and Arthur de Richemont, brother of Jean V, were to marry respectively Anne and Margaret of Burgundy, the two sisters of Duke Philip. Apart for that, «pour le bien general de Monsieur le Roy et de ses Royaumes de France & d’Angleterre, de nous & de noz Seignouries, terres, pays, & subgiez» the three dukes swore to remain friends and allies to the end of their days and to employ all their power towards the restoration of peace and order in the kingdom. It was also agreed that should one of the dukes find his possessions under attack each of the others would send him 500 soldiers (hommes darmes ou gens de trait), whose wages were to be paid by the receiving side from the second month of their service.3

Reasons for neglect

Historians’ attitudes to the Treaty of Amiens tend to conceal rather than emphasise its importance. Firstly, its ‘personal’ char-

---

acter is stressed as opposed to the ‘international’ Treaty of Troyes. As C. A. J. Armstrong described it in his article on the Anglo-Burgundian relations:

«Cette alliance scellée et signée par chacun des trois princes se distinguait et par son esprit et par sa forme des traditions cléricales et juridiques des traités. Par contre, elle ressemblait à une des lettres de «frères d’armes» si bien qu’on est en droit de dire: la rencontre d’Amiens aboutit plutôt à un accord militaire entre trois chevaliers qu’à un traité international» 4.

M. Warner, while agreeing with Armstrong on the ‘personal’ nature of the treaty, also ascribed its futility to the duplicity of Breton policy: as soon as 1425 Arthur de Richemont joined the Dauphin and received the constable’s sword, bringing Brittany to the Valois cause in 1425–1426. Though he was subsequently exiled from the Dauphin’s court, on his return into favour from 1433, he became an important mediator between Philip the Good and Charles VII during an uneasy process of bringing them to a formal reconciliation by the Treaty of Arras in September 1435. Important evidence to support this attitude to the Treaty of Amiens was found in a separate agreement between the dukes of Brittany and Burgundy signed a day after the main treaty which took into account that one of the dukes may reconcile himself with the Dauphin 5. However it has recently been noted by C. J. Rogers that this treaty was actually dealing with the help to be provided against the Dauphin, suggesting that even if one of the dukes might be able to resolve his own conflict with the Dauphin he would remain bound to help his ally in


his struggle\textsuperscript{6}. Therefore this second treaty supplemented not undermined the main Treaty of Amiens.

Finally, it is claimed that the military assistance promised by the three dukes to each other was of little significance. This may partly be due to a misprint in the edition of a vidimus of the treaty by Thomas Rymer in his magisterial collection of English historical documents (widely known as Foedera) putting \textit{cens} instead of \textit{cinq cens} and thus reducing the effectives from 500 to 100 men\textsuperscript{7}. The error may be easily discovered by collating the Rymer’s edition with the original copies of the treaty or with the text of the same vidimus as cited in several fifteenth-century chronicles\textsuperscript{8}. That said, for some researchers even the larger number of 500 men appears to be negligible\textsuperscript{9}.

As a result of these arguments it may appear that for the Lancastrian regime any benefits from the Treaty of Amiens were short-lived and insignificant, while in the longer run it facilitated the collapse of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance more than it supported its survival. Therefore in a number of general works the role of the Treaty is largely reduced to its matrimonial aspects and their possible influence on the political landscapes\textsuperscript{10}, while others may avoid mentioning it\textsuperscript{11} or depict it as one

\textsuperscript{6} Rogers C. J. The Anglo-Burgundian Alliance in the Hundred Years War,, in: \textit{Grand Strategy and Military Alliances} / P. R. Mansoor, W. Murray. Cambridge, 2016. P. 232–233. I am grateful to Professor Rogers for sending me a copy of this article. He notes that the Treaty of Troyes was not making a reconciliation with the Dauphin impossible, should it be agreed upon by Charles VI of France, Henry V of England, Philip of Burgundy and the estates of the two kingdoms. Les grands traités de la Guerre de Cent Ans. P. 113 (art. 29).

\textsuperscript{7} For example, these erroneous effectives are accepted as ‘moderate’ in \textit{Ramsay J. H. Lancaster and York: a Century of English History (A.D. 1399–1485)}. Oxford, 1892. Vol. I. P. 331.


\textsuperscript{9} Williams E. C., My Lord of Bedford. P. 100. John Ferguson describes the promised contingent as modest, \textit{Ferguson J. English Diplomacy}. P. 3.


of little value or as a failure. It appears however, that some of the argu-
ments provided may deserve reconsideration and the treaty should not be
considered in the wake of its ultimate failure but in the political context
which brought it to life. This what the present paper aims to do.

Private character of the Treaty

Comparing a ‘personal’ Treaty of Amiens of 1423 with an ‘inter-
national’ Treaty of Troyes of 1420 it is noteworthy that the latter was
made by the kings of England and France: the duke of Burgundy was
not a separate party to it. Being the only member of the French nobility
expressly mentioned in the text of the Treaty of Troyes, he, however, was
only promised he would continue to play part in the custody of Charles
VI’s person and that no peace would be made with the Dauphin without
his consent (as well as without the consent of the two kings and the Three
Estates of the two kingdoms). The treaty stated quite clearly that Henry
V, as newly appointed regent of France was responsible for suppressing
the Dauphin and his partisans; Philip the Good was only as obliged to
participate in this struggle as any other subject of the Lancastrian Dual
Monarchy was.

While the duke of Burgundy was not a party in the Treaty of Troyes
he was nevertheless pursuing his own policy. Anglo-Burgundian agree-
ment had been achieved already in late December 1419 when Henry
V and Philip the Good promised each other not to stop fi ghting the
Dauphinists and not to set free the Dauphin or any of the Montereau
murderers (should they fall into their hands) without mutual consent.
An important part of this Anglo-Burgundian treaty was formed by the
obligations which Henry and Philip took upon themselves not in their

12 Перруа Э. Столетняя война / Пер. с фр. М. Ю. Некрасова. М.; СПб, 2006.
С. 344. According to G. A. Knowlson, all three dukes only aimed to use each other
while pursuing their own goals; the alliance was first broken by the duke of Bur-
gundy by making a truce with the Dauphin in October 1424, Knowlson G. A. Jean V,
J. Barker only mentions the Treaty of Amiens in the context of the Burgundian rappro-
achment with the Armagnacs through Richemont, Barker J. Conquest: The Eng-
15 For the text of this treaty see Foedera. Vol. IX. P. 825–827.
capacity as princes and rulers but in employing their personal status, influence and skills. Apart for general promises of fraternal love and support the duke of Burgundy undertook to use his influence over Charles VI and his entourage to obtain the peace treaty between England and France; the conditions of this peace were offered by the English and, after modest modifications, they evolved into the Treaty of Troyes.

For his part Henry V promised that on his appointment to the regency he in turn would employ his powers and influence on Charles VI to secure a cession of lands in France worth 20 000 l. a year in inheritance to the Burgundian duke and his wife (Michelle of France, daughter of Charles VI) and their children. If Charles VI refused to authorise such a cession, Henry V undertook to make it himself on his succession to the French throne. Finally, a promise of a matrimonial alliance between the houses of Lancaster and Burgundy was made. Since Philip the Good was already married and Henry V’s marriage with Katherine of France was an important component of the projected Anglo-French peace treaty, it was decided that one of the English king’s brothers would marry one of the duke’s sisters.

It appears therefore that from the very start the Lancastrian regime in France was of a dual nature, based on the ‘international’ Treaty of Troyes as well as on a ‘personal’ pact with the duke of Burgundy. Hence the later treaty of Amiens was not inferior to the Treaty of Troyes but complementary. While the treaty of Troyes was projected to remain in force after the death of both signatories, the personal promises of Henry V to Philip the Good were nullified by the former’s death on 31 August 1422. Hence the Anglo-Burgundian alliance needed reconfiguration and this was the gap which the Treaty of Amiens aimed to fill.

The Breton factor

The other important achievement of the Treaty of Amiens was the introduction of Brittany into the Anglo-Burgundian alliance. In consequence of the Treaty of Troyes Henry V obtained the loyalties of a majority of Burgundian partisans, including the bourgeoisie of the Burgundian-controlled towns, first among them, Paris. Though only few magnates openly joined the Lancastrian cause in 1420, Henry V’s claim to the French throne seemed strong enough for them to make
their potential acceptance of the Treaty of Troyes a matter of bargaining. During 1420–1422 a number of French magnates — Charles III, king of Navarre and duke of Nemours, Jean, duke of Bourbon (prisoner in England since 1415), counts of Foix and Armagnac — started negotiations with Henry V. Jean V, duke of Brittany was also among those who sought negotiation 16.

Relations with Brittany were an important factor in the Anglo-French affairs due to English anxiety with the security of their communications with Gascony and (possibly even more important in the 1420s) shipping in the Channel. By 1420 the coast of Normandy was almost completely under Lancastrian control and the treaty of Troyes removed any threat from Burgundian-controlled Boulonnais and Flanders. If an alliance with Brittany could be made, the Dauphinists would be reduced to two havens only – Mont Saint Michel and Le Crotoy — for their operations against the English shipping in the Channel.

The Breton duke, however, abstained from openly joining any of the sides in the conflict. In 1415 he had failed to arrive in time to fight at Agincourt; in 1417 when the full-scale conquest of Normandy began, he did not interfere making instead a non-aggression treaty with Henry V. 17 It must have been of no little importance that his relatives were detained in England: his brother Arthur de Richemont was captured at Agincourt, while his mother Joan of Navarre was the dowager queen of England (having married Henry IV of England after the death of her first husband, Jean IV of Brittany). Moreover, the latter in August 1419 was placed under arrest on suspicion of sorcery and her possessions were confiscated 18. In 1421 Jean V made an alliance with the Dauphin 19, but

---

18 Her arrest is usually ascribed to an attempt to employ the resources of her possessions (confiscated during her imprisonment) for the continuation of war in France, but it may have been an attempt to influence the Breton duke’s position as well. See Jones M. Between France and England: Jeanne de Navarre, Duchess of Brittany and Queen of England (1368–1437), repr. in Jones M. Between France and England: Politics, Power and Society in Late Medieval Brittany. Aldershot, 2003. P. 19–20; Cosneau E. Le Connétable Richemont. P. 58.
then under the influence of Arthur de Richemont (temporarily released from captivity) changed his position and agreed to accept the Treaty of Troyes. In June 1422 Henry V ordered the release of his stepmother and the issue of safe conducts to the Breton ambassadors. Eventually on 8 October 1422 Breton representatives swore obedience to the Treaty of Troyes in Paris.

The crisis of succession

By then, however, the political situation in Lancastrian France changed significantly. The death of Henry V on 31 August 1422 while Charles VI was still alive created a power vacuum in the part of the French kingdom which had been under his government. There is little doubt that the conclusion of the Treaty of Troyes owed much to Henry V’s personal qualities and reputation which made many see him as the only man able to restore the order in the kingdom after a decade of Armagnac-Burgundian feud. Hence the choice of successor as regent was a difficult problem and the first major crisis faced by the Lancastrian regime in France.

Historians have much argued whether Philip the Good’s decision not to claim regency after Henry V’s death was willing or forced. It appears, however, that this is only of importance for the remaining two months of Charles VI’s life. As soon as Henry VI was proclaimed king, there was no better candidate for regency than John, duke of Bedford. As A. Curry has shown, the wording of the Treaty of Troyes suggested that the crown was to pass to Henry V and his heirs but not necessarily to those from his marriage with Katherine of France nor even the heirs of his body. Therefore Bedford as the eldest surviving brother of Henry V was the heir apparent to the king, who was only nine months old while Philip the Good’s was nothing but a distant relative to Henry VI. Taking into

---

20 Cosneau E. Le Connétable Richemont. P. 65.
23 C. J. Rogers has recently noted that after the death in 1422 of Michelle of France, duchess of Burgundy and sister of Henry VI’s mother Katherine of France, Duke Philip had few family ties with the young king, Rogers C. J. The Anglo-Burgundian Alliance and grand strategy in the Hundred Years War. P. 226–228.
account the high child mortality rate even among royalty and nobility, Bedford might well become king of England and France at any point\textsuperscript{24}.

In following years Bedford would become known to the contemporaries and historians as a valiant military leader and able administrator but by 1422 he had little reputation in France. His previous experience of administration was related with governing the Scottish marches and the kingdom of England during Henry V’s absence. He had already once led an army in a major battle, but the naval victory in the mouth of the Seine off Harfleur in 1416 was no match for that at Agincourt. Remaining in England as his brother’s lieutenant, he was not much engaged in the conquest of Normandy and (apart for the confrontation before Cosne-sur-Loire in August 1422 when he replaced already badly ill Henry V) he never held an independent command in France\textsuperscript{25}.

This is possibly why the Parlement of Paris hesitated for several weeks in organizing Charles VI’s funeral awaiting Philip the Good to make a statement about the role he claimed in the new circumstances. The Burgundian duke abstained from an express claim for regency, his envoys came to Paris on 7 November 1422 only to confirm his loyalty to the Treaty of Troyes and to inquire in which position the duke could better serve the kingdom, thus leaving the matter to be decided in the capital. On 19 November Bedford was formally proclaimed regent for Henry VI\textsuperscript{26}.

Having found himself in the position of power and responsibility, Bedford needed support from the French higher nobility. His position did not look strong since most negotiations with the princes and magnates started under Henry V were aborted shortly after his death. Maintaining relations with Burgundy and especially with Brittany, the latter having just had openly joined the Lancastrian cause was paramount. It is notable that in the Treaty of Amiens Bedford was not only styled with his ducal title but also as regent of France. The two other dukes had already confirmed in October-November 1422 their intention to observe the Treaty of Troyes. The new Treaty was thus to a degree an act of their

\textsuperscript{24} Rogers C. J. The Anglo-Burgundian Alliance and grand strategy in the Hundred Years War. P. 231.

\textsuperscript{25} Williams E. C. My Lord of Bedford. P. 77.

acceptance *a posteriori* of Bedford as regent and a promise of support for his future undertakings. This is of special interest that Jean V was married to Jeanne of France, the elder sister of Katherine of France, Henry VI’s mother: he theoretically could contest Henry VI’s rights to the throne in favour of his own children. By accepting him as the king the Breton duke was admitting that the Lancastrian right to the French crown was not due to Henry V’s marriage with Katherine of France but on the pre-existing right and Charles VI’s will as expressed in the Treaty of Troyes.

This leads to another dimension of the Anglo-Burgundian matrimonial alliance agreed at Amiens. Philip the Good, an offspring of a cadet branch of the house of Valois was technically a candidate (though quite distant) for the French throne. The Treaty of Troyes, however, excluded all the Valois princes from the succession of the crown of France, this included the duke of Burgundy as well. Therefore his sister’s marriage with Bedford reintroduced Philip the Good into the matrimonial network of the royal house, this time the house of Lancaster.

The marriage agreement also takes us back to Henry V’s promises of December 1419 which were left to Bedford to fulfill if he wished to maintain the Burgundian alliance. Another of these promises — a cession of lands to Duke Philip – was, according to the chronicler Monstrelet, also discussed at Amiens. Once again the situation had changed since 1419 as Michelle of France died in 1422 without bringing a child to Philip.

---

28 Curry A. E. Two Kingdoms, One King. P. 32.
29 Bedford’s marriage to Duke Philip’s sister created the closest relation possible between the two houses and should the crown of the Dual Monarchy pass to Bedford and his heirs, Philip the Good could hope to become king’s brother-in-law or maternal uncle. It has been noted that a significant factor impeding a matrimonial reinforcement of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance was the fact that between 1422 and 1430 there was no suitable English bride whose hand could be offered to Duke Philip himself, Rogers, C. J. The Anglo-Burgundian alliance and grand strategy in the Hundred Years War. P. 230.

In fact both dukes long remained childless and listed each other among their potential co-heirs. According to the marriage contract of Anne of Burgundy, if Philip died childless, she was to inherit the county of Artois. On the other hand, as Bedford was leaving Paris in 1429 to fight Charles VII, he sought to recover the relations with Burgundy and rewrote his will making his wife heiress to all his possessions in France (which at least nominally included the duchy of Anjou and the county of Maine).

Therefore a grant as agreed with Henry V — concerning the duke and his children from that marriage — was no longer relevant. It was eventually decided that the duke would keep for life the châtellenies of Péronne, Montdidier and Roye, which had been given to him as the pledge for his late wife’s dowry31.

Thus in a political sense, the Treaty of Amiens drew a line under the crisis of succession in late 1422 and finalized the transition of power in France from Valois dynasty to that of Lancaster. While P. Bonenfant’s opinion (that this treaty enabled Bedford to save an Anglo-Burgundian alliance already on the brink of rupture) seems too dramatic32, to a degree it re-established the alliance by introducing a framework of personal obligations between the dukes to back up the Dual Monarchy, thereby replacing the now out-of-date mutual promises of Henry V and Philip the Good made in December 1419.

**Military significance**

The perception that the military obligations imposed by the Treaty of Amiens were insignificant is probably based on the general estimate of contemporary army sizes, long based on the chroniclers’ reports but in recent decades much adjusted thanks to the evidence provided by financial records. It is possible to see that while during the 1410s both the English and the Burgundians were able to field armies of over 10,000 men, by the 1420s–1430s even the most significant operations such as the siege of Orléans (1428–1429) or Compiègne (1430) were undertaken by the armies of about 5000 men33. These figures relate to the size of the army in terms of accounting; including only those in receipt of wages and therefore not necessarily the overall number of armed men, if we take the latter to include valets and pages. However, there is every reason to consider the number of 500 men in the Treaty of Amiens also an

---

31 The grant was made on 8 September 1423, Armstrong C. A. J. La Double Monarchie France-Angleterre et la Maison de Bourgogne. P. 348.


accounting figure as the treaty refers to the maintenance of these soldiers after the first month of their service, a financial matter.

But how significant could such company be? It may be compared to the wider practice of the Anglo-Burgundian cooperation during the 1420s–1430s which was based on a variety of other agreements and obligations apart for those given at Amiens.34 Except for the first joint campaign in June–December 1420 the English and the Burgundians never merged all their forces into a single army. They were each waging their own war but sometimes with military assistance from the ally. When assistance was needed urgently and for a short time (e.g. at the relief of Cravant in 1423) the scale of such allied help could depend on the forces available. However, when a campaign of sieges over several months was anticipated, suggesting certain logistical and financial arrangements, the contingents provided were not very numerous, usually amounting to some 400–800 men.35 Another example: in 1415 the dukes of Orléans and Burgundy were summoned to send to the royal army 500 men-at-arms and 300 gens de trait each for the campaign which eventually culminated in the battle of Agincourt.36 Hence the promise of 500 soldiers was no simple formality.

Speaking of the military importance of the Treaty of Amiens it is also noteworthy that just before going to Amiens, in March – April 1423 Duke Philip applied to the Estates of Artois seeking financial support for an

34 For example, for the campaign of 1430 the provision of an English corps to reinforce the Burgundian army was agreed in the indenture concluded in the name of Henry VI with Philip the Good, bearing no reference to the Treaty of Amiens. For the text and historical context of this indenture see Lobanov A. The Indenture of Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, of 12 February 1430 and the Lancastrian Kingdom of France, P. 302–317.


36 Фавье Ж. Столетняя война. С. 428.
intended campaign against the Dauphinist strongholds of Guise and Le Crotoy to be undertaken together with the Lancastrian forces\textsuperscript{37}. The meeting at Amiens gave the dukes of Bedford and Burgundy a chance to coordinate their military efforts for the coming year. Therefore the treaty of friendship and alliance was of an immediate military effect.

**Duration**

Finally, the Treaty of Amiens should not be considered a dead letter by virtue of the Breton defection to the cause of Charles VII in 1425. Evidence of this is found under rather curious circumstances. In December 1431 Philip the Good, realising the inability of Lancastrian regime to deal with the crisis resulting from the victories of Joan of Arc, decided to make a truce with Charles VII. Nevertheless, while the suspension of hostilities was agreed with Charles, Duke Philip secured for himself the right to support the dukes of Bedford and Brittany on their request as prescribed by the Treaty of Amiens\textsuperscript{38}.

The duke’s position may seem somewhat two-faced: while stepping aside from the Lancastrian-Valois conflict (and abstaining from attending the coronation of Henry VI in Paris in the same month) Philip the Good still considered himself bound by his old obligations towards Bedford. It may be suggested that this reservation could also be of importance in deciding who would be appointed to govern France as Henry VI was about to return to his English kingdom. Philip the Good’s position implied that if Bedford was not re-appointed, no other English governor would have access to the military asset which the Burgundian duke could offer to his brother-in-law.

Moreover, in the next year (1432) two Burgundian captains, Philibert de Vaudrey and Jean, seigneur d’Aumont, came to join the Lancastrians at the siege of Lagny. As the Burgundian chronicler Enguerrand de Monstrelet wrote they «...se partirent du pays de Bourgogne, à tout cinq cens combattans ou environ, par l’ordonnance de leur seigneur duc de Bourgogne, servir son beau frère le duc de Bethfort...»\textsuperscript{39}. A combination of details — the emphasis on the matrimonial link between the two dukes (rather unusual for this chronicle), the effectiveness of the force and the fact that this was taking place during the truce with Charles VII (which in spite of numerous violations


\textsuperscript{38} Plancher Dom [U.] Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne. Vol. IV, P. CVIII.

\textsuperscript{39} Enguerrand de Monstrelet. La Chronique d’Enguerrand de Monstrelet, Vol. V, P. 30.
on both sides was still considered in power until at least mid-1433) — leads to a suggestion that this assistance must have been based on the obligations taken by Philip the Good at Amiens in 1423. The financial documents show that these captains remained in the service of Lancastrian France and were paid wages from its finances until April 1433\textsuperscript{40}.

**Conclusions**

It appears that at a closer look, the importance of the Treaty of Amiens merits reconsideration. First, it re-constructed the Anglo-Burgundian relations, replacing the agreement between Henry V and Philip the Good in December 1419 and imposing on Bedford the fulfillment of his brother’s obligations through an updated agreement. Second, it put a line under the transition of power in Lancastrian France from Henry V, regent for king Charles VI, to John, duke of Bedford, regent for king Henry [VI], confirming its acceptance and support by the two greatest magnates of the kingdom. Thus in spite of a much more complicated political context than it was expected in 1420, the system created by the Treaty of Troyes passed successfully its first test by succession. Thirdly, obligations relating to military assistance were of immediate effect, were by no means negligible and corresponded to the contemporary practice of joint operations. Finally, even if the alliance with Brittany proved unreliable, the importance of the Treaty for the Anglo-Burgundian relations can be traced during at least a decade, up until Bedford’s second marriage in April 1433, and possibly, to his death (as envisaged by the terms of the Treaty) and the Franco-Burgundian reconciliation in Arras, events which occurred within a single fortnight in September 1435.

---

\textsuperscript{40} BNF, Ms. Fr. 26056, No 1965, 1969; BNF, Ms. Clairambault 138, No 42; AN, K 63/19/18.
В статье анализируется один из эпизодов Столетней войны — договор, заключенный в 1423 г. в Амьене герцогом Бедфордом, английским регентом Франции, с Бургундским и Бретонским герцогами в попытке упрочить свою позицию в борьбе против Карла VII. Этот договор часто полагают незначительным по ряду причин: 1) его «личному», а не «межгосударственному» статусу; 2) последовавшему вскоре переходу Бретани на сторону Карла VII; 3) незначительности обязательств по военной взаимопомощи. Однако при более детальном рассмотрении контекста, в котором этот договор был заключен и исполнялся, возникает иная картина. Амьенский договор подвел итог кризису наследования, вызванному смертью в 1422 г. Генриха V и Карла VI; Бедфорд был признан регентом Франции при Генрихе VI и принял на себя исполнение обязательств, данных Генрихом V герцогу Бургундскому по договору между ними в декабре 1419 г. Это позволяет предположить двойственный характер Ланкастерского режима во Франции, основанного не только на договоре в Труа (1420 г.) с Карлом VI, но и на «личных» договорах с герцогом Бургундским (а в 1423 г. — еще и с герцогом Бретонским). Также при сравнении с документальными свидетельствами военный компонент Амьенского договора оказывается вполне соответствующим практике своего времени. Наконец, несмотря на предательство Бретани, можно видеть, что в англо-бургундских отношениях договор сохранял свое значение и в начале 1430-х гг.

Ключевые слова: История Франции, XV в.; Столетняя война; Ланкастерская Франция; Бургундия; Политические союзы; Амьенский договор 1423 г.; Договор в Труа 1420 г.

Information on the article


Aleksandr Lobanov
PhD, Visiting Fellow in History, University of Southampton (University Road, Southampton, UK, SO17 1BJ)

The article analyses one of the episodes of the Hundred Years War, the Treaty of Amiens — an alliance made by the duke of Bedford, English regent of France, with the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany in an attempt to consolidate his position in the struggle against Charles VII. The treaty is often considered of little value due to a combination of factors: 1) its ‘personal’ rather than «inter-state»
character; 2) subsequent defection of Brittany to the Dauphinist cause; 3) supposedly insignificant obligations of mutual military assistance. A closer look at the context in which the Treaty was concluded and implemented may reveal a different picture. The Treaty put a line under the crisis of succession triggered by the deaths in 1422 of Henry V and Charles VI: Bedford was acknowledged as regent of France for Henry VI, and took upon himself the obligations Henry V had had towards the duke of Burgundy by their agreement of December 1419. This may suggest that the Lancastrian regime in France had a dual nature based on the Treaty of Troyes (1420) with Charles VI as well as on «personal» treaties with the duke of Burgundy (and in 1423 of Brittany). The military component of the Treaty is found non-negligible if compared with the contemporary practice based on the documentary evidence. Finally, in spite of Breton defection it may be shown that in Anglo-Burgundian relations the Treaty remained observed up to the early 1430s.

Keywords: History of France – Fifteenth Century; Hundred Years War; Lancastrian France; Burgundy; Alliances; Treaty of Amiens (1423); Treaty of Troyes (1420).

Список источников и литературы


Foedera, conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliæ, et alios quosvis Imperatores, Regis, Pontifices, Principes, vel com-


Архивные материалы

Lille. Archives Départementales du Nord (ADN)
B 297. No15465.

Paris. Archives Nationales de France (AN)
K 63/19/18.

Paris. Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF)
MS. Clairambault 138, No 42.

Kew. The National Archives (TNA)
E 30/1329.

References


A. Lobanov


Rymer T. (ed.) Foedera, conventiones, litteræ, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliae, et alios quosvis Imperatores, Regis, Pontifices, Principes, vel communitates, ab ineunte sæculo duodecimo, viz. ab anno 1101,


Archival materials


MS. Clairambault 138, No 42.

Kew. The National Archives (TNA) E 30/1329.